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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 970610-CA 
v. : 
DONALD D. BOSTWICK, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
A jury convicted defendant of possession of methamphetamine, 
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2) (1998); possession of marijuana, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1998) / and possession of 
drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (1998). This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did trial counsel perform deficiently by failing to file 
a motion to suppress evidence seized during a search incident to 
an arrest? This claim presents a question of law reviewed on the 
trial record because defendant raises it for the first time on 
direct appeal without a prior evidentiary hearing. State v. 
Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah App. 1992). 
2. Did the trial court commit reversible error by 
precluding trial counsel from questioning a witness about the 
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substance of an inadmissible hearsay statement? A trial court's 
determination on the admissibility of evidence generally entails 
"a good deal of discretion." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 
(Utah 1994) (dicta). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Addendum A contains the texts of rules 401, 402, 403, 801, 
and 802, Utah rules of Evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with possession of 
methamphetamine, possession of less than one ounce of marijuana, 
and possession of drug paraphernalia (R. 1-3). A jury convicted 
defendant on all three counts (R. 112-14). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to the statutory one-to-
fifteen year prison term for possession of methamphetamine, and 
to two terms of 180 days in jail for possession of marijuana and 
drug paraphernalia (R. 134). The judge ordered that all terms 
run concurrently and gave defendant credit for the time she had 
already served (id.). 
Defendant timely filed his notice of appeal (R. 135). 
:The State recognizes that a trial court's determination 
about whether a statement is offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted presents a question of law reviewed for correctness. 
See, e.g.. State v. Perez, 924 P.2d 1, 2-3 (Utah App. 1996), cert 
denied, 934 P.2d 652 (Utah 1997) . However, defendant has not 
argued that the trial court erred in that determination; to the 
contrary, defendant argues on appeal that the trial court should 
have permitted the questions in order to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted. 
"The State also charged defendant's girlfriend, Karen 
Durham. Ms. Durham has appealed separately in case number 
970679-CA. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At 2:00 a.m. on August 26, 1996, Jacob Inches went to the 
"hot pots" in Ogden Canyon (Tr. May 21, 1997 at 69). After he 
parked, he saw a 1990 Taurus pull up and park (id. at 71-72, 
102). No one got out of the Taurus (id. at 72). Mr. Inches 
walked past the Taurus on his way to the trail leading to the hot 
pots and noticed two people sitting in the car (id.). 
The people aroused Mr. Inches' suspicions because it was 
unusual for people to stay in their cars rather than to go down 
to the hot pots, and because the Taurus windows remained rolled 
up even though it was a hot August night (id.). Mr. Inches 
became concerned about his car because he knew of prior vandalism 
at the hot pots, so he returned to his car (id. at 72-73) . When 
he observed that the Taurus had a different license plate on the 
back than on the front, he called the police (id. at 72-73). 
Sergeant Art Haney was dispatched to respond to the call 
(id. at 95). When he approached the driver's side of the Taurus, 
he found defendant in the driver's seat and defendant's 
girlfriend, Karen Durham, in the passenger's (id. at 98-99, 164). 
When Sergeant Haney asked who owned the Taurus, defendant 
responded that it belonged to a friend who had gone down to the 
hot pots (id. at 100). However, neither defendant nor Ms. Durham 
could tell Sergeant Haney the friend's name (id.). During the 
time he spent there, Sergeant Haney never saw the "friend" (id.). 
Sergeant Haney checked the license plates on the 1990 
Taurus: the rear plate was registered to a 1977 Ford LTD, and the 
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front plate was not on file (id. at 100-101) . Sergeant Haney 
then took the Taurus's identification number from the plate under 
the windshield and checked it (id. at 102). The Taurus had been 
reported stolen one month before (id. at 102, 163). 
At that point, Sergeant Haney asked defendant to get out of 
the car (id. at 102-103). He then went around to the passenger 
side and asked Ms. Durham to get out (id. at 103). 
As Ms. Durham got out, Sergeant Haney saw a brass pipe and a 
baggie, both containing marijuana, on the passenger side floor 
(id. at 104-105, 214-215). He told his backup officer to watch 
defendant and Ms. Durham and began to search the stolen Taurus 
(id. at 104). 
Sergeant Haney found a plastic bottle on the "center hump" 
between the front seats; the bottle contained methamphetamine 
rocks and several bindles with methamphetamine powder in them 
(id. at 107, 208). Next, he found a black TASCO case between the 
front seats that contained six one-half cubic centimeter 
syringes, two empty plastic baggies, a nail file, and a Q-tip 
(id. at 108). One of the syringes contained liquid 
methamphetamine, and the plastic bag contained methamphetamine 
residue (id. at 108-109, 217-18). 
Sergeant Haney turned his attention to two bags, one purple 
and one brown, in the back seat. He asked who owned the bags 
(id. at 110). Defendant first told him that Ms. Durham owned the 
purple bag (id.). However, defendant later claimed that both he 
and Ms. Durham had all of their belonging in the brown bag, and 
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that neither of them owned the purple bag (id.). 
Sergeant Haney first searched the purple bag (id.). Inside, 
he found Ms. Durham's address book, women's clothing, makeup, a 
propane torch, and a pair of TASCO binoculars (id. at 111, 128). 
He also found a black leather case that contained an empty one-
half cubic centimeter syringe (id. at 110-11) . 
Sergeant Haney next searched the brown bag (the bag that 
defendant admitted owning) (id. at 111). Sergeant Haney found 
men's clothing in that bag (id. at 112). He also found a 
Harmon's pharmacy bag containing two spoons with powder residue 
on them, six one-half cubic centimeter syringes, and a small 
candle (id. at 111-12).3 
The backup officer searched Ms. Durham's purse (id. at 114). 
That search yielded several plastic baggies with methamphetamine 
residue, a glass pipe with methamphetamine residue, and a water-
filled vial (id. at 114, 167, 176, 183, 210-11). 
While Sergeant Haney searched the Taurus, defendant and Ms. 
Durham had moved next to each other and looked like they were 
passing something between them "through their shirts" (id. at 
115, 164). As Sergeant Haney started to approach them, defendant 
broke and ran at full speed twenty to thirty feet to the river 
(id. at 115, 164, 329). Sergeant Haney chased defendant, and, 
about the time Sergeant Haney caught up to him, defendant threw a 
3Sergeant Haney testified that methamphetamine users use 
candles and propane torches to heat the powder and water to make 
liquid methamphetamine, and use spoons to heat the 
methamphetamine, all to make it injectable (id. at 131). 
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"round bundle" or a "large baggie" into the river (id. at 115, 
164) . 
Defendant refused to tell Sergeant Haney what he had thrown 
(id.). However, when Sergeant Haney pursued the issue, defendant 
claimed that it was a soiled menstrual pad that Ms. Durham was 
embarrassed about (id. at 115-16) . 
Sergeant Haney looked along the river bank, but never 
recovered the item (id. at 116). During that search, he also 
shined his flashlight over by the hot pots, but saw no one there 
(id. at 150). 
The officers arrested defendant and Ms. Durham for receiving 
stolen property, possession of controlled substances, and 
possession of drug paraphernalia (id. at 116-17; R. 7) . 
The argument sections contain additional relevant facts. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Ineffective Assistance. Defendant contends that trial 
counsel performed deficiently by not moving to suppress all of 
the evidence seized during the warrantless search, except that 
found in plain view on the floor of the car. However, the motion 
would have proven a futile gesture. This record establishes that 
trial counsel could legitimately conclude that the officers 
conducted a constitutional warrantless search incident to arrest. 
Defendant does not challenge the legitimacy of the actual arrest; 
instead, he contends only that no search incident to a lawful 
arrest occurred because the search preceded the formal arrest. 
Defendant's argument misstates the law. When a search 
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precedes a formal arrest, it is still a constitutionally valid 
warrantless search if: 1) the officers had probable cause to 
arrest the defendant based on evidence independent of that found 
during the search; and 2) the search and subsequent arrest were 
substantially contemporaneous. 
In this case, the officers had probable cause to arrest 
defendant for receiving stolen property based on evidence 
independent from that discovered during the search, and their 
search was substantially contemporaneous with defendant's arrest 
because the arrest followed closely on the heels of the search. 
Therefore, counsel could legitimately conclude that the search 
was valid, and that any motion to suppress would have proven 
futile. Counsel does not perform deficiently by failing to file 
a futile motion to suppress. 
Alternatively, defendant has not argued how, even if 
successful, filing the motion would have affected the outcome. 
Defendant concedes that the officers properly seized the evidence 
found on the Taurus's floor: the brass pipe with marijuana in the 
bowel, a baggie with marijuana, and a plastic bottle containing 
methamphetamine rocks and bindles with methamphetamine residue. 
2. Limitation of questioning. Defendant contends that the 
trial court incorrectly limited his questions of the person he 
claimed drove the stolen Taurus to the hot pots. When the 
witness took the stand, he exercised his Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination in response to many of defense 
counsel's questions. Defense counsel tried to ask the witness 
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about a prior written statement in which the witness apparently-
admitted driving the stolen Taurus to the hot pots. The trial 
court precluded the introduction of the statement itself as 
inadmissible hearsay and precluded defense counsel from asking 
questions about its substance. 
On appeal, defendant contends that the ruling violated his 
right to present a defense and violated the rules of evidence 
because it excluded relevant evidence. As to the latter 
argument, defendant contends that the questioning was relevant 
because it could establish that the witness, not defendant, drove 
the stolen Taurus. 
Both arguments are frivolous. First, defendant's right to 
present a defense does not allow him to circumvent the rules of 
evidence. 
Second, defendant apparently argues on appeal that he should 
have been allowed to put the substance of the hearsay statement 
before the jury by asking questions about it regardless of any 
answer actually given. Defendant claims that this evidence was 
relevant to establish third-party culpability. 
Defendant's argument ignores that only relevant evidence 
that complies with the other rules of admissibility may be 
admitted.. The rules precluding hearsay evidence precluded the 
questions defendant says the court should have allowed his 
counsel to ask: it would have amounted to offering an out-of-
court statement to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
Finally, the limitation on defense counsel's questions does 
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not undermine confidence in the outcome. At most, it would have 
suggested that the witness drove the car. However, that would 
not explain how so many of the drugs and paraphernalia made their 
way into defendant's and his girlfriend's bags; therefore, it 
would not have undermined the possession charges. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO FILE A FUTILE MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS THE SEIZED EVIDENCE DID NOT DEPRIVE DEFENDANT 
OF HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Defendant contends that his trial counsel performed 
ineffectively because he did not move to suppress the evidence 
seized from his and his girlfriend's bags.4 In order to prevail 
on this claim, defendant has the burden of establishing two 
elements. First, he must identify the specific acts or omissions 
he claims fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 690 (1984); 
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert, denied, 513 
U.S. 966 (1994). This element requires defendant to overcome a 
strong presumption that counsel rendered constitutionally 
sufficient assistance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 
690; Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d at 522. Defendant's claim can 
succeed only if this Court can surmise no conceivable legitimate 
^Defendant concedes that the evidence on the car's floor was 
properly seized. Appellant's Brief at 13-14. That evidence 
consisted of the brass pipe with marijuana in the bowel, the 
baggie with marijuana, and the plastic bottle containing 
methamphetamine rocks and bindles with methamphetamine residue on 
them (Tr. May 21, 1997 at 104-105, 107, 208, 214-15). 
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tactic or strategy from trial counsel's actions. State v. Perry, 
899 P.2d 1232, 1241 (Utah App. 1995) (""[T]his court will not 
second-guess trial counsel's legitimate strategic choices, 
however, flawed those choices might appear in retrospect.'") 
(citation omitted). Second, defendant must affirmatively prove 
that the challenged acts or omissions undermine confidence in the 
outcome of his criminal trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. at 694; Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d at 522. 
Because there has been no prior evidentiary hearing, 
defendant must establish both elements on the trial record. 
State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah App. 1992). 
Defendant must establish that the claimed ineffective assistance 
is a "demonstrable reality;" he cannot rely on mere speculation. 
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d at 526; Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 
870, 877 (Utah 1993) . 
Defendant contends that the circumstances in this case did 
not justify the warrantless search of the Taurus. Specifically, 
defendant contends that neither the search incident to arrest nor 
the inventory search exceptions to obtaining a warrant before 
searching the car applied in this case. Appellant's Brief at 11-
14. Therefore, according to defendant, his trial counsel had no 
legitimate tactical reason not to move to suppress all of the 
evidence except that found on the car's floor. 
Contrary to defendant's argument, this record establishes 
that counsel could legitimately conclude that the officers 
conducted a constitutionally valid warrantless search incident to 
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arrest, and that, consequently, any motion to suppress would have 
proven futile. Counsel does not perform deficiently by opting 
not to file futile motions. Cf. State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 
58-59 (Utah 1982) (holding that defense counsel's performance was 
not deficient by failing to object to the admission of evidence 
he had already unsuccessfully challenged in a suppression 
hearing), overruled on other grounds, State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 
(Utah 1986) . 
A lawful arrest of a car's occupants permits a 
contemporaneous, warrantless search of the passenger compartment. 
See, e.g. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1981); In re 
K.K.C. 636 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1981); State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 
1114, 1118-19 (Utah App. 1997); State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 
227-28 (Utah App. 1995) . The search may include containers, open 
and closed, in the passenger compartment. New York v. Belton, 
453 U.S. at 460. 
Defendant does not challenge the legitimacy of the arrest. 
Instead, he argues only that counsel could not have believed that 
the search was a valid search incident to arrest because the 
search occurred prior to the formal arrest. Appellant's Brief at 
13 . 
Well-established case law contradicts this argument. Even 
if a search commences before a formal arrest, it is still a 
constitutional warrantless search incident to arrest as long as: 
1) the officers have probable cause to make the arrest 
independent of the evidence found during the prior search; and 2) 
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the search and arrest are substantially contemporaneous. In re 
K.K.C. 636 P.2d at 1046; State v. Spurqeon, 904 P.2d at 227. 
Defendant has not and, on this record, cannot establish that 
trial counsel erroneously believed that the search satisfied both 
elements. 
First, trial counsel could legitimately conclude that the 
officers had probable cause to arrest defendant. Probable cause 
to arrest defendant required nothing more than a rationally based 
conclusion of probability that defendant was committing a crime. 
State v. Spuraeon, 904 P.2d at 226-27. 
In this case, the officers had probable cause to arrest 
defendant for receiving stolen property and ultimately did arrest 
him on that charge (Tr. May 21, 1997 at 7). Prior to the search, 
the officers discovered defendant behind the wheel of a stolen 
car (id. at 98-99, 102, 163-64). When Sergeant Haney asked 
defendant who owned the car, defendant responded that it belonged 
to a "friend;" however, neither defendant nor Ms. Durham could 
provide Sergeant Haney with the friend's name, and the nameless 
friend never returned to the car (id. at 100). Defendant also 
claimed that the nameless "friend" had gone down to the hot pots 
(id.). However, Sergeant Haney looked over at the hot pots while 
he was searching the river bank for the object defendant threw 
into the river and saw no one there (id. at 150). On these 
facts, trial counsel could legitimately conclude that the 
officers had probable cause to arrest defendant for possession of 
stolen property. Cf. State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 769 (Utah 
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App. 1990) (probable cause existed for arrest for possession of 
stolen property and driving on suspended license after officer 
learned that license plate on car was stolen and that Jackson's 
license had been suspended), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 
1991). See also State v. Spuraeon, 904 P.2d at 227 (false or 
evasive responses combined with suspicious behavior may be used 
to determine the existence of probable cause).3 
The officers also had probable cause to arrest defendant's 
for possession of controlled substances. When they opened he 
opened the door, Sergeant Haney saw the brass pipe with marijuana 
in the bowel and a baggie containing marijuana. 
Second, counsel could legitimately conclude that the search 
was substantially contemporaneous with the subsequent arrest. A 
continuous sequence of events that occur during the same period 
as the arrest satisfies the "substantially contemporaneous 
requirement." State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 1114, 1120 (Utah App. 
1997). Sergeant Haney testified to a continuous sequence of 
events: once he determined that the Taurus had been reported 
"Defendant does comment that there was no evidence that he 
had the keys to the car, or that he had stolen the car. 
Appellant's Brief at 12. To the extent that defendant intends 
this comment to suggest that the officers lacked probable cause 
to arrest him, he has failed to support that suggestion with any 
analysis or authority. See, e.g.. State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 
1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) (declining to reach the merits of the 
defendant's state constitutional challenge because defendant 
failed to provide any supporting legal analysis or authority). 
Moreover, the officers arrested defendant for receiving stolen 
property (id. at 7), not for stealing the car. Defendant does 
not attempt to explain how the facts that the officers knew 
failed to establish probable cause for the arrest on that charge, 
and, for the reasons argued in the text, the facts establish the 
contrary. 
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stolen, he asked defendant and Ms. Durham to exit the car; when 
Ms. Durham exited, he saw a brass pipe and baggie with marijuana 
in it; he told his backup officer to watch defendant and Ms. 
Durham and began searching the car; after Sergeant Haney finished 
searching the Taurus, defendant ran to the river and threw 
something in; Sergeant Haney searched for the object on the river 
bank; after he completed the search, he arrested defendant and 
Ms. Durham (id. at 102, 117, 214-15, 329). On these facts, trial 
counsel could legitimately conclude that the arrests ""followed 
quickly on the heels of the challenged search,'" State v. 
Spurgeon, 904 P.2d at 227 (quoting Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 
98 (1980)) and therefore satisfied the substantially 
contemporaneous requirement. 
Based on the above, counsel could legitimately conclude that 
the officers conducted a constitutionally valid search incident 
to arrest, even though the search preceded the formal arrest, and 
that any motion to suppress would have proven futile.6 
Therefore, defendant cannot, on this record, establish that 
counsel performed deficiently by determining not moving to 
suppress the evidence. 
Alternatively, defendant has not argued, let alone 
established, that the motion, even if successful, would have 
affected the outcome. Defendant concedes that the officers 
6By making this argument, the State does not concede that no 
other legitimate basis existed for trial counsel's decision not 
to move to suppress the evidence. The State has relied on this 
basis only because it is the one most clearly supported by the 
record and controlling law. 
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properly seized the evidence not in the bags and found on the 
car's floor. Appellant's Brief at 13-14. That evidence 
consisted of the brass pipe with marijuana in the bowel, the 
baggie containing marijuana, and the plastic bottle containing 
methamphetamine rocks and bindles with methamphetamine residue on 
them (Tr. May 21, 1997 at 104-105, 107, 208, 214-15) . Defendant 
has not explained why this evidence was insufficient to support 
his convictions for possession of methamphetamine, marijuana, and 
drug paraphernalia. Consequently, defendant has not met his 
burden to prove "to a demonstrable reality" that failing to file 
the suppression motion affected the outcome of the case. Parsons 
v. Barnes, 871 P.2d at 526. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRONEOUSLY PROHIBITED HIS TRIAL COUNSEL FROM 
QUESTIONING A WITNESS ABOUT THE SUBSTANCE OF AN 
INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY STATEMENT, OR THAT THE LIMITATION 
UNDERMINES CONFIDENCE IN THE OUTCOME 
Defendant contends that the trial court impermissibly 
limited his examination of the person he claimed drove the stolen 
Taurus. Appellant's Brief at 15-19. A trial court's 
determination on the admissibility of evidence generally entails 
a good deal of discretion. Cf. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 
(Utah 1994) (dicta). 
Defendant contends that he should have been allowed to ask 
questions about the substance of the witness's out of court 
statement. Defendant appears to argue, among other things, that 
he was entitled to put the substance of the statement before the 
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jury through the questions themselves irrespective of any answer 
actually given. The trial court correctly ruled that the 
proscription against admitting hearsay evidence also proscribed 
introducing the same evidence through questions. 
At trial, defendant called as a witness Paul Van Dyke, a man 
defendant testified that he knew only as "Dozer," and who was the 
"friend" who purportedly drove the stolen Taurus (Tr. May 21, 
1997 at R. 254, 308). When defense counsel asked Mr. Van Dyke if 
he knew defendant and Ms. Durham, he responded by exercising his 
right against self-incrimination (id. at 255). When asked if he 
remembered defense counsel meeting with him in jail, he again 
invoked the Fifth Amendment (id. at 257). 
Defense counsel next asked Mr. Van Dyke if he remembered 
signing a statement, and the State objected (id. at 258). An 
unrecorded bench conference followed (id.). 
After the bench conference, Mr. Van Dyke began answering 
some questions: he admitted seeing defense counsel in jail a few 
months prior to trial; admitted that he considered defendant and 
Ms. Durham his friends at that time; and testified that his 
perception of them had changed (id. at 258-59) . Defense counsel 
again asked Mr. Van Dyke if he had signed a statement of guilt, 
the State, again objected, and the court called an in-chambers 
conference (id. at 259-60) . 
During that conference, defense counsel showed the court a 
statement that he claimed Mr. Van Dyke had signed (id. at 261). 
However, the record contains no copy of the statement, and 
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defense counsel gave no detailed proffer about the statement's 
contents. 
The trial court ruled that counsel could question Mr. Van 
Dyke directly about his involvement on the night of the arrest 
and could treat Mr. Van Dyke as a hostile witness (id. at 266-
68). However, the trial court ruled that Mr. Van Dyke's out-of-
court written statement was inadmissible hearsay and also 
prohibited counsel from asking Mr. Van Dyke about its substance 
(id. at 266). 
In open court following the conference, defense counsel 
asked Mr. Van Dyke about previously admitting to counsel that Mr 
Van Dyke had driven the Taurus (id. at 268). The trial court 
stopped counsel's questioning and reminded counsel that the 
court's ruling permitted questions about what happened, but not 
about the prior statement (id. at 269). An unrecorded bench 
conference followed (id.) 
During the subsequent questioning, Mr. Van Dyke admitted 
that he was with defendant and Ms. Durham the night of the 
arrest, that he was with them at their home, and that all three 
of them went somewhere in a car (id. at 270). However, he again 
invoked his right against self-incrimination when asked the kind 
of car and who drove (id. at 271). Defense counsel asked no 
further questions. Transcript pages 254-72 are attached as 
addendum B. 
7Nothing in this record establishes whether the statement 
was sworn. 
17 
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court 
impermissibly limited his examination of Mr. Van Dyke. Although 
not entirely clear, defendant appears to contend that the trial 
court erroneously prohibited both: 1) questions about Mr. Van 
Dyke's actual involvement; and 2) questions about Mr. Van Dyke's 
out-of-court statement. Appellant's Brief at 15-19. 
The first argument misstates the record: the trial court 
expressly permitted trial counsel to ask questions about Mr. Van 
Dyke's involvement and counsel availed himself of the opportunity 
(id. at 266-68, 270-71). 
As for the second argument, defendant correctly asserts that 
the trial court prohibited questioning Mr. Van Dyke about the 
substance of the hearsay statement; however, he has established 
no reversible error in the ruling. Defendant argues that 
prohibiting questions about the hearsay statement's substance 
deprived him of his right to present a defense. Appellant's 
Brief at 15. To the extent defendant argues that he had a 
constitutional right to introduce the evidence regardless of its 
admissibility under the rules of evidence, his argument fails as 
a matter of law. In exercising his right to present his defense, 
defendant had to "comply with established rules of procedure and 
evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the 
ascertainment of guilt and innocence." Chambers v Mississippi, 
410 U.S. 284, 303 (1973) . Defendant has no absolute 
constitutional right to circumvent the rules of evidence. 
Defendant also contends that questions about the written 
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statement were admissible as relevant evidence because those 
questions would have raised a reasonable doubt about who actually 
drove the stolen Taurus. Appellant's Brief at 17-18. In other 
words, defendant contends that the trial court should have 
permitted his counsel to present to the jury the substance of the 
hearsay statement through counsel's questions irrespective of how 
Mr. Van Dyke might have answered those questions. This argument 
is frivolous. 
To support this argument, defendant relies solely on rules 
401 (definition of relevant evidence) and 403 (balancing the 
probative value of evidence against its potential prejudice), 
Utah Rules of Evidence. However, defendant ignores rule 402's 
proscription against admitting even relevant evidence that does 
not comply with the admissibility requirements of the remaining 
rules. Utah R. Evid. 402 ("All relevant evidence is admissible, 
except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United 
States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by 
these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this 
state") (emphasis added). 
Rules 801 and 802, Utah rules of Evidence, required the 
trial court to do exactly what defendant now claims was error. 
Rule 801 defines hearsay evidence as "a statement, other than one 
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, 
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." 
Utah R. Evid. 801(c). Rule 802 prohibits admitting hearsay 
evidence except as otherwise provided by the rules. Utah R. 
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Evid. 802.' Consequently, even if relevant, the rules of 
evidence precluded presenting the inadmissible hearsay evidence -
either by admitting the statement itself, or by counsel 
presenting the substance of the statement through his questions 
about it - and the trial court properly exercised its discretion 
by prohibiting those questions. 
Alternatively, defendant has not established that, 
prohibiting the questions about Mr. Van Dyke's statement 
undermines confidence in the outcome. Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a) 
(only errors that affect a defendant's substantial rights require 
reversal). See also State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 407 (Utah 
1989) (erroneous admission of evidence requires reversal only if 
it prejudices defendant's case). The record establishes that Mr. 
Van Dyke admitted in the written statement that he drove the 
stolen Taurus the night police arrested defendant and Ms. 
Durham.' Defendant never explains how this admission would have 
'Rules 803 to 806 identify exceptions to the proscription 
against admitting hearsay evidence. Defendant has not argued 
that any of those exceptions apply to this case. 
"During the in-chambers conference about the statement, the 
trial court commented that defendant could not offer the written 
statement for the truth that Mr. Van Dyke drove the car that 
night (id. at 263). 
During the conference, the trial court also referred to 
defendant "getting into the area" of whether Van Dyke drove the 
car and if the drugs belonged to him (id. at 265). However, the 
record does not establish whether the trial court referred to a 
direct admission of ownership in the written statement or only 
whether the trial court meant that defendant would try to show 
that Van Dyke owned the drugs found in the car because he was 
driving it. Defendant has not included a copy of the written 
statement in the record and trial counsel made no detailed 
proffer of its contents. See, e.g., State v. Davis, slip op. 
960271-CA at 18 (Utah App. August 6, 1998) (parties bear the 
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led the jury to conclude that he did not possess the controlled 
substances and drug paraphernalia. 
The State could establish that defendant knowingly possessed 
the drugs either by proving that he had actual physical 
possession of them, or by proving that a sufficient nexus existed 
between defendant and the drugs for the jury to infer that 
defendant had both the power and intent to exercise dominion and 
control over them. See, e.g., State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 
(Utah 1985) . Sergeant Haney found all of the controlled 
substances in areas of the car near where he found defendant and 
Ms. Durham sitting, or in bags that clearly belonged to them (id. 
at 107-108, 110-12, 208, 217-18, 128). For example, in the brown 
bag that defendant admitted he owned, Sergeant Haney found 
spoons, a candle, and syringes; all tools used to prepare and 
ingest methamphetamine (id. at 111-12) . This evidence established 
a sufficient nexus between defendant and the drugs for the jury 
to infer that defendant exercised control over them. See State 
v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 131 (Utah 1987) (evidence sufficient to 
support conviction for possession where drugs found under the 
defendant's clothes by defendant's bed in a locked box to which 
defendant had a key, defendant falsely denied having the key, and 
drug scales were found on his bookshelf). Compare State v. 
Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1389 (Utah App. 1991) (evidence 
insufficient where drugs found in car's back seat and Salas sat 
responsibility of compiling a record that will support their 
appellate claims). 
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in front, another passenger had better access to place where 
police found the drugs, Salas was not the exclusive owner or 
occupier of the car, Salas denied having cocaine, and Salas did 
not have the cocaine on his person). Mr. Van Dyke's out-of-court 
statement that he drove the car that night would not rebut the 
inference that defendant and Ms. Durham possessed the drugs and 
paraphernalia; therefore, excluding questions about the 
statement's substance does not undermine confidence in the 
outcome. ^ 3 
Defendant also did not behave like the innocent occupier of 
a car that contained someone else's drugs. First, he gave 
evasive answers about who owned the car (id. at 100). Second, 
the backup officer saw Ms. Durham pass something out of her shirt 
to defendant (id. at 164). Defendant then ran at full speed to 
the river's edge and threw it in (id. at 164, 329). He first 
refused to tell Sergeant Haney what it was, then gave the 
improbable explanation that he had only disposed of Ms. Durham's 
soiled menstrual pad (id. at 115-16). In light of the totality 
of the evidence, exclusion of the out-of-court statement does not 
undermine confidence in the outcome. 
lcSimilarly, even if the written statement contained an 
assertion that Mr. Van Dyke "owned" the drugs, that assertion 
would not have clearly rebutted the inference that defendant also 
exercised sufficient dominion and control over them to support 
inferring that he possessed them. As established in the text, 
the officers found some of the drugs, drug residue, and tools for 
preparing and ingesting it in defendant's and Ms. Durham's bags, 
and the rest in areas over which they had apparent control. On 
these facts, Mr. Van Dyke's "ownership" would not have negated 
defendant's knowing possession. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons argued above, the Court should affirm 
defendant's convictions. 




Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE were mailed by first-class mail, postage pre-paid, to 
the following on this 2^_aay of September, 1998: 
RANDINE SALERNO 
Weber County Public Defender Assoc. 
2568 Washington Blvd., Suite 102 





Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence." 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evi-
dence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
statute, or.by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, 
confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 801. Definitions. 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) 
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant 
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted. 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing 
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the state-
ment is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness denies 
having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the 
declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge 
against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or 
(C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person; or 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party 
and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representa-
tive capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption 
or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to 
make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's 
agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or 
employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement 
by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Rule 802. Hearsay rule. 




























RECALL. DEODORANT, WHICH I REMEMBER GETTING IN - - I REMEMBER 
THAT STUCK OUT IN MY MIND BECAUSE THE CAR HAD A SMELL TO IT 
THAT -- NOT ONLY FROM THE CIGARETTES, BUT I WAS ALMOST 
SURPRISED TO FIND SOME DEODORANT BECAUSE WHOEVER HAD BEEN 
DRIVING THE CAR, YOU KNOW, DEODORANT WASN'T PART OF HIS DAILY 
ROUTINE. BUT THE THINGS IN THIS LITTLE DUFFEL BAG ACTUALLY 
WERE, YOU KNOW, IT HAD THOSE KIND OF THINGS, DEODORANT, 
MAKEUP, CLOTHES FOLDED. 
Q. LADIES' THINGS IN IT ALSO, HUH? 
A. YES, SIR. 
MR. GILLAND: NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
MR. KOTTLER: NOTHING FURTHER. 
THE COURT: MAY STEP DOWN. YOU'RE EXCUSED. THANK 
YOU VERY MUCH. WE'LL TAKE A 15-MINUTE RECESS AT THIS POINT. 
AGAIN, I'LL ADVISE JURY NOT TO DECIDE THE CASE UNTIL YOU'VE 
HEARD IT ALL, NOT TO DISCUSS THE CASE AMONGST YOURSELVES OR 
WITH ANYONE ELSE. WE'LL BE IN 15-MINUTE RECESS. 
(WHEREUPON THE COURT TOOK A BRIEF RECESS.) 
THE COURT: OKAY. CALL YOUR NEXT WITNESS. 
MR. GILLAND: YOUR HONOR, I WOULD CALL PAUL VAN DYKE. 
PAUL VAN DYKE, 
CALLED AS A WITNESS, BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, 
WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
[BY MR. GILLAND: 
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1 Q. MR. VAN DYKE, WILL YOU STATE YOUR NAME FOR THE RECORD AND 
2 PLEASE SPELL IT? 
3 A. PAUL DAVID VAN DYKE. P-A-U-L D-A-V-I-D V-A-N D-Y-K-E. 
4 Q. WHAT ARE YOUR CURRENT LIVING CONDITIONS? 
5 A. I'M HOUSED AT UTAH STATE PRISON. 
6 Q. WHAT ARE YOU CURRENTLY SERVING TIME FOR? 
7 A. DOESN'T CONCERN YOU. 
8 Q. WHAT? 
9 A. DOESN'T CONCERN YOU. 
10 Q. CAN YOU SEE THESE TWO PEOPLE SEATED AT THE COUNSEL TABLE 
11 NEXT TO ME? 
12 A. I CAN SEE THAT FAR. 
13 Q. WHO ARE THEY? 
14 A. I STAND ON THE FIFTH AMENDMENT. 
15 Q. YOU DON'T HAVE ANY RIGHT TO THE FIFTH AMENDMENT. WE'RE 
16 NOT --
17 MR. KOTTLER: YOUR HONOR, I THINK BEFORE THIS WITNESS 
18 PROCEEDS TO TESTIFY, IT MIGHT BE A GOOD IDEA TO ADVISE HIM OF 
19 HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT. HE -- MAYBE HE ALREADY KNOWS OF 
20 THAT BY INVOKING HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT. 
21 THE COURT: YEAH, I -- IF WE'RE GONNA BE GETTING 
22 INTO AREAS THAT WOULD BE AREAS THAT WOULD BE POSSIBLY HARMFUL 
23 TO HIM, THEN I CERTAINLY WOULD. IS THAT WHAT YOU INTEND TO 
24 DO, IS TO GET INTO AREAS WHERE HE MIGHT POSSIBLY BE IN A 
25 POSITION WHERE HE MAY INCRIMINATE HIMSELF OR --
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MR. GILLAND: YOUR HONOR, I GUESS WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO 
DO IS ASK THE COURT TO RECOGNIZE THIS WITNESS AS A HOSTILE 
WITNESS. 
THE COURT: WELL, LET'S DEAL WITH THEM ONE ISSUE AT 
A TIME FIRST. OKAY? LET ME JUST GIVE THE CAUTIONARY 
INSTRUCTION, AND I THINK MR. VAN DYKE, HE'S ALREADY INDICATED 
AND HE PROBABLY IS AWARE OF IT, BUT OF COURSE YOU UNDERSTAND 
YOUR RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. YOU HAVE A RIGHT 
AGAINST ANSWERING ANY QUESTIONS THAT MAY CAUSE -- PUT YOU IN 
HARM AND THAT MAY INCRIMINATE YOU IN ANY WAY. 
THE WITNESS: I UNDERSTAND MIRANDA VERSUS ARIZONA. 
THE COURT: OKAY. YOU UNDERSTAND, THOUGH, THAT YOU 
DON'T HAVE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS IN COURT WHERE THERE MAY BE A 
POSSIBILITY OF A QUESTION MAY ULTIMATELY COME BACK TO HAUNT 
YOU IN SOME WAY AND CAUSE YOU A PROBLEM --
THE WITNESS: I UNDERSTAND --
THE COURT: -- VIOLATION OF THE LAW. 
THE WITNESS: -- CONSTITUTION. 
THE COURT: OKAY. AND, HOWEVER, IF HE DOES ASK YOU 
A QUESTION THAT DOESN'T GO INTO THAT, THEN WE'D ASK YOU TO 
ANSWER THOSE. OKAY? ALL RIGHT. AND YOU'RE ASKING THAT HE BE 
DECLARED A HOSTILE WITNESS? I'M NOT -- I DON'T THINK WE'RE AT 
THAT POINT YET. 
MR. GILLAND: OKAY. 
THE COURT: MAYBE WE'LL GET THERE. 
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1 MR. KOTTLER: YOUR HONOR --
2 THE COURT: WHAT? 
3 MR. KOTTLER: -- AT THIS POINT, DEFENSE COUNSEL HAS 
4 ASKED THE WITNESS A QUESTION. HE HAS INVOKED HIS FIFTH 
5 AMENDMENT RIGHT AND THE --IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY AT THIS POINT 
6 TO ADDRESS THIS QUESTION. 
7 THE COURT: I DON'T KNOW. DO YOU WANT TO PROCEED 
8 WITH ANOTHER QUESTION? LET'S JUST -- LET'S JUST LET 
9 MR. GILLAND HANDLE IT. HE'S GONNA ASK ANOTHER QUESTION OF 
10 HIM. 
11 MR. GILLAND: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
12 Q. DO YOU REMEMBER ME SITTING IN THE JAIL WITH YOU A COUPLE 
13 MONTHS AGO? 
14 A. I INVOKE MY FIFTH AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT. 
15 Q. YOU REMEMBER ME SITTING WITH YOU IN THE JAIL A COUPLE 
16 MONTHS AGO? 
17 A. I INVOKE MY CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT. 
18 Q. FOR MEMORY? 
19 A. I STAND BEHIND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT. 
20 THE COURT: WHY DON'T YOU ASK A FEW MORE QUESTIONS. 
21 IT MAY BE THAT WE'RE NOT GONNA HAVE ANY ANSWERS TODAY? 
22 MR. GILLAND: MAY BE WHAT, YOUR HONOR? 
23 THE COURT: IT MAY BE FROM THE WAY THINGS ARE 
24 SHAPING UP THAT WE'RE NOT GONNA HAVE ANY ANSWERS TODAY, AND I 



























TO APPEAR THAT WAY, SO WE COULD FIND OUT QUICKLY AND THEN 
MAYBE WE CAN DEAL --
|BY MR. GILLAND: 
Q. DO YOU REMEMBER SIGNING A STATEMENT, MR. VAN DYKE, ABOUT 
YOUR --
MR. KOTTLER: YOUR HONOR, I'M GONNA OBJECT TO THIS. I 
THINK -- AND I THINK I KNOW WHAT MR. GILLAND IS ASKING FOR. 
AND I DON'T THINK THAT IT WOULD BE ADMISSIBLE AT THIS POINT. 
MAY BE THAT WE'LL NEED TO APPROACH THE BENCH. 
THE COURT: YEAH, I DON'T KNOW --
THE WITNESS: I REMEMBER SIGNING THAT STATEMENT. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. GILLAND: WHAT --
THE COURT: I DON'T KNOW, WHAT IS IT --
(WHEREUPON A CONFERENCE WAS HELD AT THE BENCH.) 
THE COURT: GO AHEAD, MR. GILLAND. 
[BY MR. GILLAND: 
Q. HAVE YOU EVER SEEN ME BEFORE, MR. VAN DYKE? 
A. YES, I HAVE. 
Q. WHERE DID YOU SEE ME? 
A. I SEEN YOU IN JAIL, SEEN YOU IN COURT, SEEN YOU OTHER 
PLACES. 
Q. WHEN DID YOU SEE ME IN JAIL? 
A. SOME TIME BACK. COULD I MAKE A STATEMENT? 



























THE WITNESS: OKAY. GO AHEAD. 
THE COURT: YOU JUST NEED TO ANSWER HIS QUESTIONS. 
IBY MR. GILLAND: 
Q. WHEN DID YOU SEE ME IN JAIL? 
A. I SAW YOU IN JAIL. 
Q. NO, FEW MONTHS AGO? 
A. SOMETHING LIKE THAT. 
Q. OKAY. DO YOU REMEMBER OUR CONVERSATION? 
A. YEAH, I REMEMBER IT. 
Q. OKAY. AT THAT TIME, DID YOU CONSIDER THESE PEOPLE YOUR 
FRIENDS, SITTING NEXT TO ME? 
A. AT THAT TIME I DID. 
Q. SOMETHING CHANGE FOR YOU? 
A. YEAH. 
Q. IS YOUR UNDERSTANDING THAT YOU MIGHT BE PUNISHED FOR 
ANSWERING QUESTIONS HERE TODAY? 
A. SEVERELY, YES. 
Q. DID YOU SIGN A STATEMENT OF GUILT ON A --
MR. KOTTLER: YOUR HONOR --
MR. GILLAND: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) WITH ME --
MR. KOTTLER: -- I OBJECT TO THIS STRONGLY, YOUR 
HONOR. HE'S ASKING FOR HEARSAY AT THIS POINT. 
THE COURT: WELL, NO, HE'S NOT ASKING FOR WHAT THE 
STATEMENT SAID. HE JUST SIMPLY ASKED IF HE SIGNED A 
STATEMENT, NOT WHAT HE SAID. 
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MR. KOTTLER: HE DID REFER TO THE CONTENTS OF THE 
STATEMENT. 
THE COURT: YOU KNOW, I THINK WE PROBABLY NEED TO 
DISCUSS THIS IN CHAMBERS BECAUSE I'M -- I'M -- I NEED TO BE 
FILLED IN ON WHAT THE PROBLEM IS HERE. I DON'T KNOW, I'M A 
LITTLE BIT IN THE DARK AS TO WHAT THE CONFUSION IS AND WHAT 
THE PROBLEM IS. IN ORDER TO CLARIFY THAT, I'M GONNA TAKE JUST 
TAKE A BRIEF RECESS. I'LL JUST ASK EVERYBODY TO STAY WHERE 
YOU'RE SEATED AND I'LL TALK TO COUNSEL IN CHAMBERS, AND THEN 
WE'LL GO FROM THERE SHOULDN'T TAKE TOO LONG, AND I JUST ASK 
YOU TO BE PATIENT AND WAIT. THANKS. WE'LL BE IN BRIEF 
RECESS. 
(WHEREUPON THE COURT TOOK A BRIEF RECESS.) 
IN CHAMBERS 
MR. KOTTLER: WE'RE ON THE RECORD NOW? 
THE CLERK: UH-HUH. 
THE COURT: RIGHT. THE RECORD SHOULD REFLECT WE'RE 
IN CHAMBERS IN THIS CASE AND THAT WE'RE REFERRING TO A 
STATEMENT AND THERE'S BEEN A NUMBER OF OBJECTIONS ABOUT --
THAT RELATE TO HIS RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION AND I'M 
(UNINTELLIGIBLE) ENOUGH INFORMATION TO RULE ON THESE THINGS. 
AND LET'S JUST GET IT CLARIFIED NOW SO THAT WE CAN MOVE THIS 
ALONG. WE'VE GOT A FAIRLY UNCOMFORTABLE SITUATION OUT THERE. 
CLEARLY, THIS WITNESS IS NOT HAPPY TO BE HERE. HE'S FROM THE 
PRISON. HE SEEMS TO BE COOPERATING AT THIS POINT AND I THINK 
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1 YOU MIGHT AS WELL TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THAT RIGHT NOW BECAUSE I 
2 DON'T THINK IT'S GONNA LAST A WHOLE LOT LONGER. HE SEEMS TO 
3 BE WILLING RIGHT NOW, BUT HE'S OBVIOUSLY VERY, VERY UPSET 
4 ABOUT SOMETHING. 
5 MR. KOTTLER: YOUR HONOR, WHAT I'M EXPECTING IS 
6 STATEMENT THAT --
7 MR. GILLAND: 
8 MR. KOTTLER: 
9 THE COURT: 
10 MR. KOTTLER: 
11 THE COURT: 
12 IF I SEE IT. 
13 MR. KOTTLER: 
14 THE COURT: 
15 THINGS? 
16 MR. KOTTLER: NO, HE HASN'T. AT THIS POINT THE 
17 STATEMENT ITSELF, THE STATE'S POSITION WOULD BE THE STATEMENT 
18 ITSELF WOULD BE HEARSAY UNLESS -- ON -- ONLY UNDER ONE 
19 CONDITION WOULD IT BE ABLE TO COME IN, AND THAT WOULD BE FOR 
20 IMPEACHMENT. AND IF HE'S INVOKING HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT 
21 NOT TO INCRIMINATE HIMSELF, HE'S NOT GIVING A STATEMENT THAT 
22 COULD BE USED TO IMPEACH HIM. I THINK THAT MR. GILLAND IS 
23 EXPECTING AT THIS POINT THAT IF HE DOES SPEAK UP, HE'S GONNA 
24 SAY, NO, HE'S GONNA CHANGE HIS STORY AND SAY, NO, I WASN'T 
25 THERE, I DIDN'T HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH THIS, AND THEN 
WE'VE TALKED ABOUT IT A LITTLE BIT. 
-- THE STATEMENT THAT MR. GILLAND --
OKAY. WELL, WHAT IS THE STATEMENT? 
-- HAS BEEN REFERRING TO --
JUST SHOW IT TO ME. IT DOESN'T MATTER 
YOUR HONOR, COUPLE OF THINGS --
HAS HE BEEN CHARGED WITH ANY OF THESE 
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ill MR. GILLAND WOULD IMPEACH HIM WITH THIS SIGNED STATEMENT --
2 THE COURT: RIGHT. 
3 MR. KOTTLER: -- THAT WOULD COME IN AT THAT POINT, BUT 
4 IF HE'S INVOKING HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS --
5 THE COURT: WHAT ARE YOU INTENDING TO DO BECAUSE HE 
6 HASN'T GOT --
7 MR. GILLAND: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) CAUGHT ME A LITTLE OFF 
8 GUARD BECAUSE I DIDN'T KNOW UNTIL YESTERDAY THAT HE HAD BECOME 
9 IRRITATED, HE'S --
10 THE COURT: OKAY. 
11 MR. GILLAND: -- A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT PERSON. 
12 THE COURT: OKAY. 
13 MR. GILLAND: AND SO YESTERDAY, JOHN TOLD ME, YOU 
14 KNOW, THAT HE WAS -- I MEAN I MAY NOT WANNA CALL HIM BECAUSE 
15 WHEN HE COMES OUT THERE HE'S GONNA BE SCREAMING AND YELLING 
16 PROFANITIES AND --
17 THE COURT: IF HE -- IF YOU ASK HIM -- AND FIRST OF 
18 ALL, YOU HAVE TO ASK HIM THE QUESTIONS IF -- BEFORE YOU CAN 
19 USE THE STATEMENT TO IMPEACH HIM, AND IF HE DENIES IT, IF HE 
20 DENIES --
21 MR. GILLAND: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
22 THE COURT: WELL, THAT'S RIGHT. HE HAS A RIGHT TO 
23 DO THAT. HE HAS A RIGHT TO DO THAT. 
24 MR. KOTTLER: AND IF HE DOES IT, THEN HE CAN'T 
25 IMPEACHED BASED ON THE PRIOR STATEMENT. 
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1 THE COURT: I DON'T THINK YOU CAN USE IT TO IMPEACH 
2 HIS INVOCATION OF RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. 
3 MR. GILLAND: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) I'M CAUGHT OFF GUARD, 
4 BUT THERE WAS --
5 THE COURT: AND I REALIZE THAT, YOU KNOW, HE 
6 OBVIOUSLY CHANGED GEARS ON YOU REALLY QUICKLY IN YOUR CASE AND 
7 OBVIOUSLY HE MAY BE AN IMPORTANT WITNESS IN YOUR DEFENSE, BUT 
8 1 THINK THE PROBLEM YOU HAVE HERE IS HE HAS A RIGHT TO DO IT, 
9 AND IF I WERE HIM, I'D DO THE SAME THING. 
10 MR. GILLAND: MY PROBLEM IS FURTHER ENHANCED BECAUSE 
11 WHEN I FOUND THIS OUT, I IMMEDIATELY STARTED TRYING TO CONTACT 
12 OFFICER OLROID --
13 MR. KOTTLER: ODERKIRK. 
14 MR. GILLAND: ODERKIRK. I LET HIM KNOW I WANTED TO 
15 SUBPOENA HIM. HE WAS THERE AND PRESENT WHEN PAUL SIGNED THE 
16 STATEMENT, AND SO I WANTED TO CALL HIM TO TESTIFY AS TO THE 
17 AUTHENTICITY OF THE SIGNATURE --
18 MR. KOTTLER: ONCE AGAIN, THAT WOULD BE --
19 THE COURT: THE KEY IS --
20 MR. GILLAND: AND I GAVE HIM A SUBPOENA THIS MORNING. 
21 THE COURT: YEAH, YOU KNOW, HE MAY HAVE SIGNED THAT 
22 AND YOU -- BUT TO OFFER THIS SOMEHOW FOR THE TRUTH THAT HE IN 
23 FACT HAD BEEN DRIVING THE CAR AND -- THAT'S HIS STATEMENT AT 
24 THAT TIME. THERE'S NO WAY TO SAY THAT THAT'S TRUE OR NOT. IF 
25 YOU'RE OFFERING IT FOR THE TRUTH AS HEARSAY, AND IT DOESN'T 
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COME IN. IF HE TAKES STAND AND SAYS, I'M NOT ANSWERING YOUR 
QUESTIONS UNDER OATH BECAUSE I DON'T WANT TO PERJURE MYSELF 
AND/OR I DON'T WANT TO INCRIMINATE MYSELF, THEN HE HAS A RIGHT 
TO DO THAT. AND I DON'T THINK YOU CAN BRING IT IN. YOU CAN'T 
BRING IT IN FOR THE TRUTH THAT IN FACT HE DID THAT. NOW, 
IF -- AND IF IT'S SIMPLY TO IMPEACH HIM, SHOWING THAT HE MADE 
A PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENT AND HE INVOKES HIS RIGHT 
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION, HE'S NOT (UNINTELLIGIBLE) THE 
STATEMENT --
MR. GILLAND: AND ACTUALLY, YEAH, THERE MAYBE -- HE --
THAT'S IT, MAYBE IT'S TIME TOO TURN HIM LOOSE AND LET THE --
LET THE DEFENDANTS SAY WHAT HAPPENED --
THE COURT: WELL, I THINK --
MR. GILLAND: -- THAT THE JURY RECONSIDER --
THE COURT: WELL, I THINK THAT'S WHERE YOU'RE AT 
WITH THAT. I MEAN YOU RUN INTO A PROBLEM WITH THE WITNESS AND 
THAT'S (UNINTELLIGIBLE) REALLY UNFORTUNATE. HE FOR WHATEVER 
REASONS DECIDED NOT TO COOPERATE WITH YOUR CASE, AND SOMETIMES 
THAT'S THE WAY IT GOES. YOU KNOW, I DON'T KNOW WHAT MORE YOU 
CAN SAY, BUT I CAN'T -- I CAN'T LET THE STATEMENT COME IN 
THROUGH THE BACK DOOR AND IF HE'S INVOKING HIS RIGHT AGAINST 
SELF-INCRIMINATION AND IF THAT'S WHAT WE'RE GOING -- BECAUSE I 
DIDN'T KNOW THAT'S WHAT THE STATE WOULD SAY (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
MR. GILLAND: MY INTENTION WAS THAT HE WOULD -- HE 
WOULD BE HOSTILE, WE WERE TALKING ABOUT THAT, TRY TO - - I 
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WOULD JUST TRY TO GO THROUGH THE QUESTIONS AND LET HIM SAY 
WHATEVER HE WANTED TO SAY. 
THE COURT: UH-HUH. 
MR. GILLAND: AND THEN TURN HIM LOSE, BUT --
THE COURT: BUT IF I THINK IF YOU'RE GONNA BE 
GETTING INTO HIS -- THE AREA OF WHETHER HE WAS DRIVING THE 
STOLEN CAR, IF IT WAS HIS -- THE FACT THEY WERE HIS DRUGS, 
THOSE TYPE OF THINGS, YOU KNOW, THAT'S --HE HAS A RIGHT NOT 
TO TAKE THAT (UNINTELLIGIBLE) IF HE CHOOSES TO. THE FACT THAT 
HE SIGNED THAT PAPER A WHILE AGO NOT UNDER OATH, I THINK -- I 
DON'T THINK IT WAIVES ANYTHING AT ALL. HE MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN 
TELLING THE TRUTH THEN. AND SO TO OFFER IT FOR THE TRUTH IS 
PROBLEMATIC BECAUSE THERE'S NO WAY TO -- ALL IT -- IT'S PRIOR 
INCONSISTENT STATEMENT CERTAINLY --
MR. GILLAND: BUT ONLY THE --
THE COURT: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) BUT ONLY THE STATEMENT 
TODAY, IT'S A REAL -- KIND OF A REAL GLITCH (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
BUT I THINK THAT'S WHERE WE ARE (UNINTELLIGIBLE) NOW, IT'S UP 
TO YOU WHETHER YOU WANNA CONTINUE TO QUESTION HIM ABOUT 
ANYTHING ELSE, I DON'T (UNINTELLIGIBLE) I MEAN YOU CAN ASK HIM 
QUESTIONS AND HE'LL CONTINUE TO INVOKE THE FIFTH AMENDMENT, 
AND THAT CERTAINLY --IT DOESN'T PRECLUDE YOU FROM ASKING 
OTHER QUESTIONS. HE'S BEEN ADVISED AND YOU CAN DO THAT. 
MR. KOTTLER: I WOULD JUST ASK THAT IF THAT'S GONNA 
HAPPEN THAT HE NOT ASK HIM IN A LEADING FASHION. FOR EXAMPLE, 
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I MEAN I DON'T WANT -- IF THE WITNESS ISN'T GOING TO BE 
WILLING TO ANSWER, I DON'T WANT THE INFORMATION TO GET TO THE 
JURY THROUGH MR. GILLAND'S MOUTH BY SAYING, FOR EXAMPLE, DO 
YOU REMEMBER SIGNING THIS STATEMENT --
THE COURT: OH, NO, I'M NOT TALKING ABOUT THE 
STATEMENT. I'M TALKING ABOUT DIRECT QUESTIONS REGARDING HIS 
INVOLVEMENT WITH THIS. I THINK HE HAS A RIGHT TO GO THROUGH 
THAT --
MR. KOTTLER: IF HE SAYS --
jTHE COURT: -- REGARDLESS OF WHETHER HE INVOKES THE 
FIFTH AMENDMENT --
MR. GILLAND: BUT NOT IN A CROSS-EXAMINATION 
FASHION --
MR. KOTTLER: NOT IN A LEADING FASHION --
THE COURT: WELL --
MR. KOTTLER: -- ARE YOU GONNA PERMIT HIM TO SAY, 
ISN'T IT TRUE THAT THE DRUGS IN THE CAR WERE YOURS? ISN'T IT 
TRUE THAT YOU WERE DRIVING THAT STOLEN CAR THAT NIGHT? SEE, 
THAT'S WHAT I'M WORRIED ABOUT, ALL THE INFORMATION IS GONNA 
GET TO THE JURY ANYWAY AND HE'S GONNA BE INVOKING HIS FIFTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT --
;THE COURT: WELL --
:MR. KOTTLER: -- THE JURY'S GONNA SAY, WELL, 
OBVIOUSLY, HE'S INVOKING HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT BECAUSE --
THE COURT: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) FRANKLY, BECAUSE HE'S A 
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HOSTILE -- HE'S BECOME A HOSTILE WITNESS, AND I THINK HE'S 
ENTITLED TO LEAD HIM TO A CERTAIN EXTENT. I DON'T -- YOU 
KNOW, I DON'T THINK THERE'S, YOU KNOW, A PROBLEM WITH THAT. 
AND HE CAN INVOKE IT OR NOT. HE'S CLEARLY HOSTILE 
(UNINTELLIGIBLE) IF YOU WANT, IF HE'S GONNA ASK HIM TO --
MR. GILLAND: YES, AND --
THE COURT: -- AND I THINK HE'S ENTITLED TO THAT. 
HE'S NOT A COOPERATIVE WITNESS. AND HE WAS LED TO BELIEVE HE 
WOULD BE. AND SO I THINK HE'S ENTITLED TO -- HE CAN -- HE CAN 
CONTINUE TO -- EITHER TO DENY OR ANSWER THE QUESTION OR INVOKE 
HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT. 
MR. GILLAND: THAT DOESN'T COMPROMISE HIS FIFTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT BECAUSE HE HAS ADMITTED NOTHING THE WAY HE 
SAYS (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
THE COURT: RIGHT, WELL, I MEAN HE MAY -- THE 
PROBLEM (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
MR. GILLAND: YES. 
THE COURT: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) PLEAD FIFTH AMENDMENT. 
MR. KOTTLER: IT'S -- FIFTH AMENDMENT'S NOT A RULE OF 
EVIDENCE, IT'S A RULE -- IT'S A RIGHT OF A DEFENDANT. I THINK 
THAT'S --
THE COURT: IF YOU WANT --IF YOU WANNA DO THAT, I'M 
NOT --
MR. GILLAND: IF YOU'RE --
THE COURT: -- TRYING TO TELL YOU WHAT TO DO, BUT 
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I -- I'M JUST ANTICIPATING THAT WE MIGHT (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
ANYTHING ELSE? 
MR. GILLAND: OKAY. 
THE COURT: LET'S GO AND GET -- LET'S TRY TO GET 
MOVING ON THIS SO WE CAN GET THROUGH. 
IN OPEN COURT 
MR. GILLAND: YOUR HONOR, I WOULD LIKE TO REQUEST THAT 
THIS DEFENDANT BE CONSIDERED HOSTILE. 
THE COURT: AND DO YOU WANNA JUST LAY SOME 
FOUNDATION FOR THAT REQUEST AND SO I --
MR. GILLAND: YOUR HONOR, THE WITNESS HAS INDICATED TO 
ME IN THE PAST THAT HE WOULD ANSWER THE QUESTIONS. NOW HE 
DOES NOT WANNA ANSWER THE QUESTIONS. AND I WAS NOT AWARE OF 
THIS UNTIL YESTERDAY MORNING. DONE WHAT I COULD TO TRY TO 
GIVE HIM AN OPPORTUNITY TO ANSWER THE QUESTIONS. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. GIVEN THAT, I WILL ALLOW YOU 
TO CROSS-EXAMINATION HIM IN A LEADING FASHION. OR TO EXAMINE 
HIM WITH SOME LEADING QUESTIONS WITHIN -- OF COURSE WITHIN 
REASON. 
[BY MR. GILLAND: 
Q. THANK YOU. MR. VAN DYKE, YOU DO REMEMBER WHEN I SAT WITH 
YOU IN JAIL, CORRECT? 
A. YEAH. 
Q. THERE YOU TOLD ME THAT YOU'D DRIVEN YOUR FRIENDS, DON 



























THE COURT: I'M GONNA JUST -- JUST LET ME INTERVENE. 
THAT IS NOT THE KIND OF QUESTION WE DISCUSSED BEING ASKED 
HERE. MY UNDERSTANDING IS THAT YOU WERE SIMPLY GONNA GO 
THROUGH THE FACTUAL SCENARIO AND NOT REFER TO THAT. AND I'M 
GONNA AS YOU TO REPHRASE THE QUESTION AND I'M GOING TO ASK YOU 
TO AVOID REFERRING TO THAT. WE HAVE SPECIFICALLY DISCUSSED 
THIS. AND THAT'S WHAT -- THAT'S WHAT --
MR. GILLAND: I'M AWARE WE DISCUSSED IT. MAY WE 
APPROACH THE BENCH FOR A SECOND? 
THE COURT: TO THE SIDE PLEASE. 
(WHEREUPON A CONFERENCE WAS HELD AT THE BENCH.) 
[BY MR. GILLAND: 
Q. MR. VAN DYKE, DO YOU REMEMBER THE NIGHT OF AUGUST THE 
26TH, 1996? 
THE WITNESS: YOUR HONOR, THERE'S A DOCUMENT IN MY 
FILE AND IT STATES THAT I WAS GIVEN IMMUNITY OR NO OTHER 
CHARGES WOULD BE PRESSED AGAINST ME FOR COPPING TO A COUPLE OF 
CHARGES, AND I WAS SENT TO PRISON ON, AND ONE OF THEM WAS IN 
YOUR COURT. NOW, UNDER WARD VERSUS UTAH, DOES THAT IMMUNITY 
STAND AT THIS TIME? SO THAT I CAN ANSWER THIS MAN'S QUESTIONS 
WITHOUT BEING PROSECUTED TO THE EXTENT OF THE LAW? 
THE COURT: MR. VAN DYKE, I DON'T SPECIFICALLY 
RECALL WHAT HAPPENED THAT DAY, AND I DON'T FEEL COMFORTABLE AT 
ALL MAKING THAT ASSURANCE TO YOU. AND I WOULD -- MY 



























INTERESTS, YOU KNOW, NOT NECESSARILY RELYING ON SOMETHING LIKE 
THAT. 
THE WITNESS: I HAVEN'T -- I'M BEING REFUSED 
PROTECTION OF THE COURTS AND I OF COURSE HAVE NO LEGAL COUNSEL 
HERE TO REPRESENT ME ON THIS MATTER, SO THEREFORE, I HAVE TO 
PLEAD FIFTH AMENDMENT ON EVERYTHING. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. AND I -- AND I THINK THAT'S 
UNDERSTOOD AND I'M JUST NOT IN A POSITION TO ASSURE YOU ABOUT 
THAT QUESTION, SO -- GIVE YOU AN ANSWER TO IT, AND I DON'T 
WANT YOU TO BE MISLED ABOUT IT, SO I'M JUST -- I CAN'T ANSWER 
IT. 
1BY MR. GILLAND: 
Q. YOU CAN ANSWER, HOWEVER, YOU WOULD LIKE, MR. VAN DYKE. 
A. YES, I REMEMBER THAT NIGHT. BUT I'M NOT --
Q. CAN YOU REMEMBER ANYTHING PARTICULAR ABOUT IT? WHY DOES 
IT STAND OUT TO YOU? 
A. BECAUSE SOME PEOPLE THAT I THOUGHT WERE FRIENDS WERE 
ARRESTED THAT NIGHT. 
Q. WERE YOU WITH THOSE FRIENDS THAT NIGHT? 
A. YES, I WAS. 
Q. DID YOU -- WERE YOU WITH THEM AT THEIR HOME THAT NIGHT? 
A. YES, I WAS. 
Q. DID YOU GO ANYWHERE IN A VEHICLE THAT NIGHT? 
A. YES, I DID. 
Q. WERE THE THREE OF YOU IN THE VEHICLE THAT YOU WENT IN? 
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1 A. YES. 
2 Q. DO YOU RECALL WHAT KIND OF VEHICLE THAT WAS? 
3 A. I STAND ON THE FIFTH AMENDMENT THERE. 
4 Q. OKAY. WAS -- WERE YOU THE DRIVER OF THE VEHICLE? 
5 A. I STAND ON THE FIFTH AMENDMENT. 
6 MR. GILLAND: THINK, MR. VAN DYKE, THAT'S ALL THE 
7 QUESTIONS I HAVE FOR YOU AT THIS TIME. 
8 THE COURT: DOES THE STATE HAVE ANY QUESTIONS? 
9 MR. KOTTLER: I DON'T THINK I DO. 
10 THE COURT: OKAY. THANK YOU. YOU'RE EXCUSED. AND 
11 YOU MAY CALL YOUR NEXT WITNESS, MR. GILLAND. 
12 MR. GILLAND: YES, YOUR HONOR --
13 MR. KOTTLER: YOUR HONOR, BEFORE WE GO ON, THE 
14 REFERENCE THAT MR. GILLAND MADE OF (UNINTELLIGIBLE) OR 
15 STATEMENT THAT WAS WRITTEN BY THE PRIOR WITNESS, I WOULD ASK 
16 AT THIS TIME THAT THE JURY BE INSTRUCTED THAT THAT BE 
17 DISREGARDED AND THAT THAT BE STRICKEN FROM THE RECORD. 
18 THE COURT: I'LL STRIKE THE QUESTION REGARDING THE 
19 STATEMENT THAT WAS REFERRED TO EARLIER THAT I SUSTAINED THE 
20 OBJECTION ON. 
21 MR. KOTTLER: THANK YOU. 
22 THE COURT: GO AHEAD, CALL YOUR NEXT WITNESS PLEASE. 
23 MR. GILLAND: DEFENSE CALLS KAREN DURHAM. 
24 THE COURT: AND YOU'LL GO THROUGH HER RIGHT NOT TO 



























TESTIFY, GET HER PERMISSION TO PROCEED? 
MR. GILLAND: SURE. 
KAREN DURHAM, 
CALLED AS A WITNESS, BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, 
WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
[BY MR. GILLAND: 
Q. KAREN, WOULD YOU STATE YOUR NAME FOR THE RECORD? 
A. KAREN MAY DURHAM. 
Q. AND WOULD YOU SPELL IT PLEASE? 
A. K-A-R-E-N M-A-Y D-U-R-H-A-M. 
Q. OKAY. MRS. DURHAM, YOU'VE CHOSEN TO TAKE THE WITNESS 
STAND AT THIS TIME. ARE YOU AWARE OF YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT NOT TO TAKE THE TIME WITNESS STAND? 
A. YES. 
Q. ARE YOU AWARE THAT THE STATE HAS THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO 
PROVE THEIR CASE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT WHETHER YOU TAKE 
THE WITNESS STAND OR NOT? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND IF YOU TAKE THE WITNESS STAND, THAT YOU COULD BE 
CALLED TO ANSWER QUESTIONS, AND IF THOSE QUESTIONS ARE 
ANSWERED IN AN INCRIMINATING FASHION, THEY COULD INCRIMINATE 
YOU? 
A. YES. 
Q. SO -- SO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT THAT 
